

ROUTING

Top Secret 217

(Security Classification)

TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	<i>HYC</i>		
2			
3			
4			
<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE
REMARKS:			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.			DATE

CONTROL NO.

25X1

25X1

Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Wednesday April 20, 1977

CG NIDC 77-91C

25X1

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

State Dept. review
completed

DIA review(s) completed.

Top Secret

(Security Classification)

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0

National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, April 20, 1977.

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

CONTENTS

ISRAEL: Withdrawal Windfall

Page 2

ZAIRE: Situation Report

Page 3

PAKISTAN: Violent Demonstrations

Page 6

SIERRA LEONE: Election Rigging

Page 7

USSR: Comment on Red Sea Area

Page 9

WEST EUROPE: Views on Human Rights

Page 12

PHILIPPINES: Referendum Wrap-up

Page 13

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0

25X1

ISRAEL: Withdrawal Windfall

25X1

[REDACTED] *The resignation of Israeli Prime Minister Rabin as head of the dominant Labor Party may paradoxically turn out to be an advantage for the party in the national election next month. Rabin's withdrawal effectively ends his long-standing rivalry with his successor, Defense Minister Peres, opening the way for Peres to unite the party. The sudden change in Labor's leadership has also thrown the main opposition parties off balance, making it more difficult for them to campaign as the only parties capable of making long-overdue reforms.*

25X1

[REDACTED] The legal charge against Rabin--maintaining unauthorized bank accounts abroad--is not considered a serious offense by Israelis, among whom this practice is widespread. In fact, Rabin's quick admission of guilt and his rapid action in stepping aside have created a wave of public sympathy, making it unlikely that the incident will damage the party. Peres' accession to the party's top spot virtually by default has not left pro-Rabin factions as embittered as they would be if Peres had openly defeated Rabin in their head-on competition at the party's convention in February.

25X1

[REDACTED] To a considerable extent, Peres has already succeeded in rallying groups within the coalition Labor Alignment behind him. He has broadened his appeal beyond his customary right-wing constituency by offering key cabinet posts to Foreign Minister Allon and Abba Eban, leaders of Labor's moderate factions, and by promising not to change Israeli foreign policy. These moves also played an important role in persuading the left-wing Mapam party to remain allied with Labor.

25X1

[REDACTED] The Labor Party's ability to close ranks rapidly around Peres has come as an unwelcome surprise to the conservative Likud opposition and to the new Democratic Movement for

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0

25X1

Change led by Yigael Yadin. Leaders of both groups initially had seen the scandal over Rabin's bank accounts and his resignation as a windfall for their attacks on Labor Party corruption. They had also anticipated that Peres' accession would split the Labor Party and cause Mapam to bolt the Alignment.

25X1

[] Likud and Yadin's party now face in Peres a more politically adept and dynamic leader than Rabin, and a man untainted by any hint of corruption. Peres' quick and smooth takeover of the party leadership should enable him to make a strong case to the electorate that Labor is capable of reforming itself and will seek to introduce broad political and social changes. This should give Peres a better chance than Rabin to counter the reformist appeal of the Democratic Movement for Change and Likud.

25X1

[] In particular, Peres may be able to attract back to Labor some of its traditional supporters, who became disillusioned with Rabin and defected in large numbers to Yadin's party. Peres' reputation as a hawk, moreover, may enable him to blunt Likud's appeal to Labor right-wingers, who distrusted Rabin.

25X1

ZAIRE: Situation Report

25X1

[] Zairian forces have launched a modest counteroffensive against the Katangan invaders in Shaba Region and may have scored a few limited successes.

25X1

25X1

25X1

[] The two-pronged counterattack apparently was launched recently from the Kolwezi area. A battalion-size task force moving along the rail line is reported to have crossed the Lufupa River, and a similar task force has advanced slightly along the main road to Nasondoye. A smaller unit is blocking the southwestern approaches to Kolwezi.

25X1

[] Moroccan troops appear to be playing a role in the Zairian counterattack, but we cannot confirm that they are involved in the fighting.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0

it appears more likely that the Moroccans that are assigned to the counterattack are acting as a reserve force for Zairian troops. Other Moroccan troops stationed in Kolwezi reportedly are guarding dams and bridges in that area.

25X1

[redacted] government troops have captured some Katangan equipment and a few prisoners during the counterattack. If true, the Katangan prisoners would be the first taken by government forces since the invasion began, and their capture would suggest that the Zairian army's performance has improved.

25X1

[redacted] Zairian forces also claim to have captured Katangan equipment during scattered fights around Kafakumba over the past few days. Government troops in northern Shaba still appear to be conducting a holding action.

25X1

[redacted] The Zairian air force continues to be largely ineffective; the US defense attache reports that many pilots are refusing to perform their missions and several errors, such as the recent bombing of Zambian territory, have occurred. The air force reportedly has begun using light utility aircraft as spotters to prevent combat missions from straying. The US embassy reports that, according to Italian technicians, three additional ground attack aircraft should be operational next week.

25X1

[redacted] The continuing military activity in southern Zaire is placing a growing strain on the country's limited logistic capability. According to the defense attache, only one of the four C-130 transports that were operational when the conflict began is still flying. To replace the C-130s, which have played an important role in shuttling troops, equipment, and supplies from the Kinshasa area to Shaba, the air force hopes to requisition a few civilian transports. The US embassy reports a backlog of supplies in Kinshasa earmarked for the south.

25X1

[redacted] The Moroccans are also developing supply problems, having brought with them only enough Muslim rations for a week. Their problems may soon be solved, however, since they are establishing a logistics base in Gabon from which supplies and equipment shipped from Morocco will be flown to Zaire. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0

25X1


Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0

25X1


Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0

25X1



PAKISTAN: Violent Demonstrations

25X1

 *Demonstrations in support of Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto could lead to even more violence, greatly increasing the chance of military intervention.*

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0

25X1 [] In the largest effort so far by the Prime Minister's supporters, several thousand members of his Pakistan Peoples Party, some firing pistols, marched through Lahore yesterday. On Sunday, a march by student supporters of the party in Karachi ended in a stone-throwing fight, and the same day three persons reportedly were killed in clashes in Hyderabad. On Monday, a pro-Bhutto mob rampaged through the streets of Lyallpur. A pro-Bhutto procession is to be held in Karachi today.

25X1 [] Clashes between Bhutto's party and the opposition have been increasing for about a week. In most incidents, party members have fired on demonstrators who, in some cases at least, were trying to burn down buildings owned by Bhutto's supporters.

25X1 [] The new demonstrations presumably are designed to show that Bhutto still has widespread popular support. His party is, however, unlikely to attract crowds the size of those the opposition is able to put on the streets--100,000 in Lahore on Monday, for example. Opposition demonstrators are also armed, some with automatic weapons.

25X1 [] The next major opposition effort will be a general strike on Friday. The reconvening of the national assembly next Tuesday is also likely to be an occasion for major demonstrations. Bhutto presumably called for the assembly session in the hope that it would serve as evidence that he can still conduct government business.

25X1 [] The military continues to appear reluctant to intervene, but it might have little choice should widespread violence erupt. The police would lack both the capability and the will to control major new disturbances. []

25X1

25X1

SIERRA LEONE: Election Rigging

25X1 [] *Sierra Leone President Stevens' agreement to a special parliamentary election on May 6 has failed to end the political strife in his virtually one-party state.*

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0

25X1

[redacted] Despite the promise of a free election, made by Stevens in an attempt to restore public order during anti-government riots in February, his supporters used strongarm tactics last week against opposition candidates trying to register for the election. Violence, resulting in a dozen or more deaths, broke out in district capitals as rival politicians tried to present their nomination papers.

25X1

[redacted] //Special interest groups, particularly labor and students, could provoke widespread disorders prior to the election.

25X1

25X1


25X1

[redacted] The student-led rioting earlier this year was sparked by a desire for political expression, as well as public dissatisfaction over the President's personal corruption and the nation's economic problems.

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0



USSR: Comment on Red Sea Area

25X1

[Redacted] The Soviets have issued their first extensive media comment on recent Sudanese and Saudi efforts to wean Somalia and South Yemen away from the USSR, and the line is predictably negative.

25X1

[Redacted] In an Izvestia article last Friday, prominent political commentator V. Kudryavtsev took the line that the West is encouraging conservative Arab involvement in the Red Sea area to weaken Arab unity and to distract the Arabs from their main

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0

foe, Israel. The article gives no hint of how Moscow plans to respond to the recent moves of Saudi Arabia and Sudan in the area other than to quote the Ethiopian-Cuban communique on the need for progressive forces to unite against the common "imperialist" enemy.

25X1

[REDACTED] The Soviets' concern about losing their currently pre-eminent position in Somalia and South Yemen clearly has increased since the failure of Cuban President Castro's mediation effort between Ethiopia and Somalia last month and President Podgorny's unsuccessful stopover in Mogadiscio in early April.

25X1

[REDACTED] Having tried and failed to mediate Somali-Ethiopian differences, Moscow may now try to reassure Somalia by offering more military and economic aid. The USSR thus far has shown no sign of being willing to abandon its courtship of the radical regime in Ethiopia in the interest of preserving its position in Somalia.

25X1

[REDACTED] The Soviets probably would seriously consider curtailing their support for Ethiopia if the Somalis took steps to reduce the Soviet presence, especially the Soviet naval presence, in Somalia. The Somalis, however, are unlikely to take such action until alternate military support--equal to that provided by the USSR--is assured.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0

25X1

WEST EUROPE: Views on Human Rights

25X1

[] EC foreign ministers meeting in London on Monday urged that Western rhetoric on human rights be framed in a way that will not jeopardize detente, while still expressing Western concern for these rights. The ministers will seek to coordinate their views with the US at the NATO summit on May 10, EC officials said.

25X1

[] In a discussion aimed at preparations for the Belgrade review of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the foreign ministers also signaled their opposition to a disproportionate focus on human rights at Belgrade by advocating that the review give equal emphasis to military and economic issues.

25X1

[] These views were reinforced by socialist and social democratic party leaders from 23 countries, including eight heads of government, who met in Amsterdam last weekend to discuss East-West relations. Socialist International president Willy Brandt said that the leaders believe "there is no alternative to detente" and that they are distressed because "in the name of human rights, conservative forces put into danger what has been initiated" by detente.

25X1

[] Brandt and other West European political leaders share a profound concern for human rights and support the US in its defense of human rights principles, but they feel vulnerable to Soviet power and hence fearful that Western tactics might provoke the Soviets to back away from detente. Brandt warned against "dangerous misjudgments" on human rights and observed that "most of us do not believe that verbal acts of strength will be helpful."

25X1

[] These concerns, however, put socialist and social democratic party leaders in difficult positions at home, where conservative parties capitalize on the popular appeal of the human rights issue. The socialist leaders' meeting--aimed in part at supporting Dutch Prime Minister den Uyl and the Dutch Labor Party in the election scheduled for late May--was probably an attempt to regain the initiative on human rights in West European domestic politics.

25X1

25X1

[] Differences between European socialists and conservatives on human rights are compounded by differences among West European governments themselves. Norway and the Netherlands have recently been most outspoken in support of US actions on human rights, whereas West Germany fears that dissidents in Eastern Europe may be endangered by strong Western statements.

25X1

PHILIPPINES: Referendum Wrap-up

25X1

[] *The outcome of the referendum on Sunday in the southwestern Philippines will strengthen President Marcos' hand in negotiations with Arab representatives who are due in Manila today.*

25X1

[] The Arab countries have long been pressing Marcos to grant concessions to the Philippines' Muslim minority, which is concentrated in the south. On Sunday, however, the voters in 13 southwestern provinces solidly rejected the notion that the autonomous area Marcos agreed to set up should be dominated by Muslims. Voter turnout was light to moderate, and many Muslims apparently boycotted the referendum.

25X1

[] The Arab representatives are likely to reject the results of Sunday's vote. They will probably press Marcos to get started forming a provisional government for the region in accordance with the compromise agreement worked out last month between Libyan President Qadhafi and the Philippine first lady.

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0

25X1

[redacted] Marcos has suggested a number of appointees to a provisional government of the region and has offered a post to the leader of the Muslim political front. Marcos is likely, however, to hold firm against granting significant powers to the "autonomous" government of the region. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0

Top Secret

(Security Classification)

Top Secret

(Security Classification) Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010034-0